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INTRODUCTION  
When the World Trade Center collapsed in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 
attacks, experts, and the public generally agreed that terrorism would be a facet of 
modern life in the foreseeable future, and that the likelihood of nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons being deployed against societies is real rather than apparent. Of 
these, perhaps the least understood is bioterrorism: “the unlawful or threatened use of 
microorganisms or toxins derived from living organisms to cause death or disease in 
humans, animals, or plants so as to create fear in the public or intimidate 
governments.”1  
In a situation where uncertainty is high, how do citizens react? Few studies have 
attempted to provide insights into the way the public may respond to issues, topics, or 
practices people think are threatening or risky.2 So far, decision analysts have suggested 
two approaches: the technical or rational and the normative or value-laden approach. 
This study investigates which of these two approaches predicts people’s level of worry 
and dread before, during and after a bioterrorist event, and offers suggestions to help 
mitigate such legitimate public reactions.  
Recent experiences with biological attacks have raised new and heightened national 
security concerns. In November 2009, perhaps as a scare tactic, envelopes mailed from 
Dallas to foreign consulates in Manhattan were found to contain a suspicious powder, 
but field tests came back negative for dangerous substances.3 An incident in 2001, 
however, was lethal. Letters contaminated with anthrax, sent to media companies and 
the Washington, DC offices of two senators, resulted in twenty-three cases of infection, 
five deaths, and the contamination of numerous U.S. Postal Service facilities.4 
Department of Homeland Security experts warned that the spores released in this case 
could be used to seed the bio-weapons programs of “rogue” countries like North Korea, 
and active terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, the Marxist insurgents in Colombia, the 
Chechen resistance fighters against Russia, the Maoist rebels of Nepal, as well as 
domestic biological “unabombers.”5 Natural epidemics are terrifying enough, but the 
notion that pathogens can be harnessed as weapons is even more chilling.  
Historically, whenever biological weapons are deployed in terrorist events, they cause 
low casualties but high visibility.6 Today, however, experts say there is no weapon more 
effective in creating havoc than microorganisms spread to large swaths of the 
population.7 A 1993 report by the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment 
estimates that between 130,000 and three million deaths could follow the aerosol 
release of 100 kilograms of anthrax spores upwind of Washington, DC.8  
The prospect of epidemics caused by the deliberate release of biological agents on 
civilians, and the well-chronicled vulnerabilities of societies to large-scale disease 
outbreaks, fulfill the litany of factors hypothesized to lead to the amplification of risk: (1) 
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the projected fatalities and injuries are high; (2) exposure to bioterrorism agents is 
expected to be widespread; (3) the effects on civilians can be immediate; (4) the impact 
on the future looks devastating; (5) the news media are the major “social stations” for 
amplification; (6) the origin of fatalities may be unknown in the period immediately 
after the attack; (7) the risks are likely to be shared across society; and (7) there is much 
uncertainty concerning when, where, and how the attack is going to happen.9 As such, 
unlike most natural epidemics, bioterrorism incidents present atypical risk-
communication challenges.  
Even the prospect of experiencing bioterrorism incidents is likely to produce high 
levels of worry and dread among the public. Worry generally refers to mental distress or 
agitation resulting from concern for something impending or anticipated. Dread, on the 
other hand, is an emotion that ranges from extreme uneasiness to extreme fear in the 
face of a disagreeable prospect. The worry and dread factors involved in bioterrorism 
incidents may be intense because most biological weapons are inexpensive and can kill 
the same number of people as conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons.10 Another 
advantage biological agents offer to terrorists is that they can target and infect a large 
area, they are easily transmitted, and they are difficult to detect.11 Their pathology 
mimics other illnesses so that by the time the cause is identified, precious time is already 
lost.  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In the late 1980s, risk was defined as either a physical attribute (the positivistic view) or 
a social construct (the constructivist view).12 Sociologists have offered cultural, 
individual, and systems approaches to understanding risks.13 Others have proposed a 
broader classification that differentiates between technical, psychological, sociological, 
anthropological, and geographical perspectives.14 Most of these classifications, however, 
are more descriptive than analytical.  
Although Ortwin Renn claims the positivistic view and the social constructivist view 
of risks are poor descriptions of reality,15 the risk amplification and attenuation 
framework he and his colleagues at Clark University developed incorporates the 
dimensions of these two foundational perspectives.16 Today, the technical or rational 
approach and the normative or value approach to understanding reactions to risky 
technology and events are still useful analytical tools with which to define and prioritize 
actions that must be taken for public safety and security.17 
If risk is indeed an objective property of events, measured as the probability of 
occurrence of adverse effects, Renn submits that the policy implications of these two 
approaches are obvious.18 Grounded on economic theories of rational citizens, the 
technical/rational approach holds that people make risk decisions based on a personal 
cost-benefit analysis informed by scientific and technical data. From this perspective, 
opposition to anything experts define as “safe” results from not understanding or not 
knowing the actual “objective” risks.19 Public opposition, in this case, is often defined as 
a problem in effective risk communication.20 Effective, in this context, usually means 
improved methods of presenting technical risk information. 
Sandman defines risk perception as ensuing from the combined impact of hazard and 
outrage (risk = hazard + outrage).21 The technical/rational approach is akin to how 
Sandman conceptualizes “hazard,” which he illustrates as resulting from experts’ 
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judgments and evaluations of risk. The hazard dimension of Sandman’s definition 
implies that public resources are allocated following objective measures of probability 
and magnitude of harm arising from risk and risk events as defined by experts.  
But the risks that do damage and the risks that raise concerns are completely 
different, Sandman observes.22 According to cognitive psychologists and decision 
analysts, this may be because the public is not composed of adroit technical decision-
makers. This observation leads to the proposition that there are psychological and social 
variables that mitigate risk perception. Among them are the signal potential of cultural 
symbols and signs whose impacts derive from the meanings people attach to them in 
active interaction with their social environment. If the risk is seen as a cultural or social 
construction, as in the case of the normative/value approach, risk priorities and 
management should reflect social values, lifestyle preferences, and people’s 
psychographic characteristics, among others. The task of risk communication, in this 
case, is to improve the correlation between technical assessments and public concern.23 
To enhance public confidence in the system that manages the risk, risk communicators 
must understand people’s underlying risk-assessment systems and values.  
According to the normative/value approach, people incorporate a number of 
“qualitative” dimensions in their decisions about risky technologies: the object or event’s 
catastrophic potential and controllability, the scientific uncertainty surrounding it, its 
equity dimension in terms of who should bear the risk, and the threat it poses to future 
generations, among others.24 Those stressing normative/value elements argue that the 
decision maker is not an isolated entity using a restricted range of information. They 
emphasize contextual factors, such as social networks, organizational memberships, 
social class, and cultural understanding evolving from a history of technological 
successes and failures.25 In other words, based on this perspective, debates about risky 
topics, issues and practices require far more than technical risk estimates; they involve 
religious, moral, political, and psychological considerations as well.26 
Which of these two approaches and the factors that constitute each of them have the 
greatest impact on the risk decisions of ordinary citizens? This question is of more than 
academic interest; it involves issues of resource allocation and the likelihood of success 
in overcoming or minimizing public opposition to a new technology or a new practice, or 
in preparing them for hazardous attacks.  
To account for people’s level of worry and dread about experiencing bioterrorist 
events following the technical/rational approach, we assess the relative impact of four 
potential predictors: (1) knowledge of bioterrorism, (2) exposure to news coverage of 
bioterrorism, (3) attention to news coverage of bioterrorism, and (4) education. The 
media variables are critical in this conception because the technical/rational approach is 
hypothesized to become stronger in the presence or absence of risk communications 
that impart scientifically-based information about the threatening event and how to 
protect people against the direct and indirect consequences of these events. 
Bioterrorism is an issue that requires some grounding in the sciences to be clearly 
understood. As such, level of education also is predicted to influence risk attitudes and 
degrees of worry.  
 Among those who advance the normative/value approach are the proponents of the 
social amplification of risk framework (SARF), who argue that the risk experience is “not 
only an experience of physical harm but the result of processes by which groups and 
RODRIGUEZ AND LEE, FACTORS AFFECTING PUBLIC WORRY 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG 
4 
 
individuals learn to acquire or create interpretations of risk.”27 Using this framework, 
risk perception can be evaluated by recognizing the physical harm experts attach to a 
risk event, the social and cultural processes that shape interpretations of that event, the 
consequences of the event, and the response of risk managers and publics to that 
event.28 
An element important to SARF is the role of public trust in different institutions, such 
as regulatory bodies, government agencies, and the mass media in mediating public 
responses to potential hazards. Lynn Frewer proposes that the extent to which people 
trust or distrust these institutions may affect the way they process risk information.29 
Indeed, the importance of source characteristics such as credibility and honesty has long 
been recognized in social psychological models of attitude change.30 Intensive media 
coverage, according to Jeanne and Roger Kasperson, may not be a sufficient condition 
for amplification, but “trust may be a critical issue in the mediation of whether 
amplification occurs, as is public perception of the effectiveness of the handling of the 
hazardous event by authorities, which may, in turn, impact on the extent to which the 
authorities themselves are perceived to be trustworthy.”31 In this study, the dimension of 
trust is measured using people’s perceived satisfaction over the level of national and 
local preparedness to prevent, counter, and bear the brunt of bioterrorist attacks.  
Thus, if the normative/value perspective dominates public reactions, then the 
following factors are hypothesized to explain people’s levels of worry and dread about 
experiencing bioterrorist events: (1) trust in the news media, (2) trust in interpersonal 
communication sources, (3) trust in government agencies and institutions, (4) trust in 
universities and advocacy groups, (5) alienation from the government, and (6) the 
perceived preparedness and readiness of the nation to protect itself and to counter 
bioterrorist attacks.  
The conceptual framework that outlines the two approaches and the factors that 
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework showing the two sets of potential contributors to level of worry and level 
of dread regarding bioterrorist events 
METHODOLOGY 
Data for this analysis were gathered using a national mail survey. The original sample of 
2,000 names and addresses used in this study was randomly drawn from the white 
pages of city, suburban, and rural telephone directories across the continental United 
States. All respondents were adults, eighteen years of age and older, who responded to a 
structured survey questionnaire sent by mail. By sending a reminder postcard three 
weeks after the first wave, and mailing to a follow-up second wave two weeks later, 363 
completed questionnaires were received. Of the original 2,000, 229 were returned as 
undeliverable, reducing the total number of questionnaires successfully mailed to 1,771 
and resulting in a response rate of 20.5 percent.  
The Dependent Variables 
The first dependent variable – worry about bioterrorist events – was measured by 
asking respondents, “How worried are you about terrorism through biological means 
(such as the use of mail contaminants like anthrax and the release of other pathogens to 
cause human, animal and plant infections)?” The response range was 1 to 5 where 1 was 
“not worried” and 5 meant “very worried.”  
Nine items tapped the dimensions of the second dependent variable, level of dread. 
These items asked respondents the extent to which they agreed with the following 
statements: (1) I have enough information to protect myself and my family against 
bioterrorist attacks; (2) The government is well prepared to protect the nation against 
bioterrorist attacks; (3) The state and local governments are well prepared to protect 
their constituents against bioterrorist attacks; (4) More research needs to be done on 
how to protect the public against bioterrorism; (5) The idea that food and water can be 
contaminated with deadly pathogens frightens me; (6) The Department of Homeland 
Security's color-coded threat and security advisory helps considerably in alerting the 
public about all kinds of terrorist threats; (7) I know where to get help in case of 
bioterrorist attacks; (8) The media do a good job of informing me about the dangers 
posed by potential bioterrorist attacks, and (9) I am powerless against terrorist attacks. 
The response to these items ranged from 1 to 5, where 1 meant “strongly disagree” and 5 
meant “strongly agree.” The sum of the responses to all items was averaged to measure 
people’s level of dread.32 The items comprising this multidimensional variable were 
found to be internally consistent; the reliability of the scale was alpha=0.61.33   
The Predictor Variables Using the Technical/Rational Approach 
The technical/rational approach suggests a number of variables that may affect public 
perceptions of the risks inherent in bioterrorist acts. The variables of interest in this 
study were (1) knowledge of bioterrorism, (2) exposure to news coverage of 
bioterrorism, (3) attention to news coverage of bioterrorism, and (4) education.  
Knowledge of bioterrorism was measured by the respondents’ scores on a ten-item 
quiz composed of close-ended objective questions asking them about different aspects of 
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bioterrorism (i.e., bioterrorism agents, the most commonly used pathogens in terrorism 
acts, the “symptoms” of bioterrorist attacks, scientific risk assessments of hazards 
attendant to bioterrorist attacks, commonly recommended cures, and the things they 
should do if a deadly virus were unleashed in their town). Respondents were asked to 
indicate whether each statement was true or false. The sum of correct answers was used 
to measure knowledge. 
To gauge exposure to mediated news, respondents were asked how often they access 
newspapers, talk shows, magazines, websites or other programs that discuss 
bioterrorism on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 meant “hardly ever” and 5 meant “every day.” 
The means of people’s answers to exposure questions across media – television, radio, 
print and online newspapers, print and online magazines, and other web-based sources 
– were computed to arrive at an overall measure of exposure to bioterrorism-related 
news coverage. A reliability test of the index gave an alpha of 0.69.  
Attention to bioterrorism coverage was measured by asking respondents to indicate 
how closely they attend to programs about bioterrorism they see on television, listen to 
over the radio, read in newspapers and magazines, and view in online news sources. The 
average of their answers to these questions across media was computed to arrive at an 
overall measure of attention to bioterrorism-related news coverage. The items 
comprising this scale were found to be internally consistent; the reliability of the scale 
was alpha=0.89. 
Education was a categorical variable measured by asking respondents the highest 
level of formal education they have completed. 
The Predictor Variables Using the Normative/Value Approach 
Using the normative/value approach, the following factors were hypothesized to explain 
levels of worry and dread: (1) trust in the news media, (2) trust in interpersonal 
communication sources, (3) trust in government agencies and institutions, (4) trust in 
universities and advocacy groups, (5) alienation from the government, and (6) the 
perceived preparedness and readiness of the nation to counter and respond to 
bioterrorist attacks.  
Respondents were asked how much they trust five mediated sources of information 
(magazines, radio and TV news programs, newspapers, and the online editions of 
newspapers and magazines) on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 meant “do not trust at all’ and 5 
meant “trust very much.” The sum of the responses to these scales were averaged and 
used as a measure of trust in mass media. The alpha coefficient of internal reliability for 
these four items was 0.79. 
The respondents’ evaluations of trust in interpersonal communication channels were 
treated the same way, so that the trust estimates for family, friends, and doctor or 
primary health care provider were summed and averaged to form this index. The three 
items comprising the index were found to be internally consistent (alpha=0.68). 
The factor trust in government agencies and institutions was composed of the 
respondents’ assessments of six government entities most concerned with national 
security and protection: the Centers for Disease Control, the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, the Department of Homeland Security, and public health officials. The 
reliability of the index was ascertained at alpha=0.88. 
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Trust in universities and advocacy groups was measured by the overall assessments 
of trust in the American Medical Association, food companies, churches and religious 
organizations, university scientists, and consumer advocacy groups. The reliability of 
this trust index was alpha=0.65.  
The three-item alienation from government index measured the degree to which the 
respondents believed that (1) the federal government can protect the country in the case 
of a terrorist attack, (2) state and local governments can protect the country in the case 
of a terrorist attack, and (3) government at all levels is powerless against any terrorist 
attack. The items that constitute this index were found to be internally consistent 
(alpha=0.62).   
The respondents’ level of satisfaction regarding the preparedness and readiness of 
the nation to counter bioterrorist attacks was measured by computing for the average of 
their responses to six questions that asked how satisfied they were about (1) the safety of 
the country's reservoirs and water supply, (2) the inspection process for imported food, 
(3) the readiness of national government, (4) the preparedness of state and local 
governments to respond to a bioterrorist attack, (5) the potential availability of vaccines, 
and (6) the availability of antibiotics or antidotes in the event of a threat or in times of 
crisis. The answers to these scales ranged from 1 to 5, where 1 was “not satisfied at all” 
and 5 meant “highly satisfied.” This was found to be a reliable index (alpha=0.88).  
The impact of the demographic variables of age, income, and gender on the two 
dependent variables were also ascertained.  
Each of the two dependent variables was subjected to multiple and hierarchical 
regression analysis to determine the amount of change in levels of worry and dread 
accounted for by the thirteen predictor variables listed above.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The Sample’s Demographic Characteristics 
Of the 363 respondents, 244 or 67.2 percent were males. The sample is relatively 
mature, with a mean age of 54.85 years, ranging from eighteen to ninety-seven years. A 
little more than a quarter of respondents (105 or 28.9 percent, the mode) have gone to 
vocational schools or have had some college experience; ninety-three (25.6 percent) 
have completed college and eighty-five (23.4 percent) have had postgraduate training. 
The mode for total household income from different sources is $25,000 to $49,999, 
with the median lying at the $50,000 to $74,999 range. The majority was Caucasian (81 
percent). 
The sample did not meet the expectation that few would have much knowledge of 
bioterrorism – the agents that may cause it, the ways in which dangerous pathogens can 
be released, the symptoms of an attack, the nature of the ensuing epidemics, and the 
direct and indirect consequences of bioterrorist acts. Most of the respondents gave the 
correct answer to eight of the ten-item knowledge quiz (m=8.06, sd=1.64). 
The respondents’ high level of knowledge about bioterrorism is perhaps triggering a 
similarly high level of alienation from the government and the efforts it has shown so far 
to protect them against terrorist threats. This level of alienation may have been 
exacerbated by the fact that 69.3 percent of them disagree to strongly disagree that the 
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federal government is well prepared to protect the nation against bioterrorist threats 
(m=3.93, sd=1.03). Close to 73 percent disagree to strongly disagree that the state and 
local governments have developed strategies to protect citizens against such attacks 
(m=4.03, sd=0.97). However, a little more than half (50.2 percent) disagree to strongly 
disagree that the government is powerless against these threats (m= 2.47, sd=1.15). 
These findings indicate the presence of a high level of concern among citizens about the 
government’s ability to counter bioterrorist threats and a perception that government at 
all levels remain unprepared against such attacks. Nevertheless, most admit the 
government has the power to do something to quell attacks.  
The Sample’s Mass Media Habits 
As shown in Table I, the respondents report watching television news (60.5 percent) and 
reading about bioterrorism in print and online newspapers “once in a while” to 
“somewhat often” (71.8 percent). They say they were exposed “once in a while” (44.3 
percent) to bioterrorism content in magazines (print and online), other Web sources 
(53.4 percent), and radio news (54.9 percent), in that order. When asked how much 
attention they pay to news items about bioterrorism, they say they pay “fair” to “close 
attention” to TV (67.4 percent), newspaper, radio (46.8 percent) and magazine reports 
(36.6 percent), but “very little” to “fair” attention to news concerning this issue in Web 
sources (30.3 percent) outside of the online editions of newspapers and magazines. 
 
 
Table I. Exposure and attention to mass media bioterrorism content 
 
 N MEANS STD. DEV. 
Exposure to    
Television 339 2.36 1.10 
Radio 272 1.62 0.84 
Newspapers (print and online) 303 2.26 0.92 
Magazines (print and online 219 1.75 0.84 
Other online sources  178 1.62 0.80 
    
Attention to    
Television 339 3.24 1.10 
Radio 272 2.97 0.84 
Newspapers (print and online) 303 3.13 0.92 
Magazines (print and online) 219 2.93 0.84 
Other online sources  174 2.57 0.80 
Descriptive statistics were computed with exposure coded as 1= hardly ever, 2= once in a while, 3= 
somewhat often, 4= often, 5= every day. Attention was coded as 1= no attention at all, 2= very little 
attention, 3= fair attention, 4= close attention, 5= as closely as I can.  
The Sources the Respondents Trust 
Table II lists the different sources of information (categorized as interpersonal, mass 
media, government, and university and advocacy groups) and the respondents’ trust of 
these sources. The table shows that family members were the most trusted source of 
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information about bioterrorism, followed by the Centers for Disease Control, their 
doctor or primary health care provider, the American Medical Association, and public 
health officials, in that order. Two of the five most trusted sources were interpersonal 
communication sources, and the rest were government agencies and individuals in 
charge of health care and medical research. 
 
Table II. Trust in interpersonal, mass media, government and advocacy groups  
 




Interpersonal communication sources    
Family 349 3.83 1.15 
Friends 351 3.13 1.05 
Doctor or primary health care provider 347 3.61 1.09 
Mass media sources    
Magazines 349 2.72 0.93 
Radio 315 3.08 0.99 
Television 355 2.95 1.06 
Newspapers (print and online) 344 2.88 0.98 
Other online sources  333 2.45 1.01 
Government sources    
USDA 348 3.10 1.07 
CDC 351 3.78 1.04 
FDA 354 3.16 1.10 
EPA 353 3.22 1.05 
DHS 353 3.18 1.15 
Public health officials 347 3.34 0.92 
Universities and advocacy groups    
Consumer advocacy groups 335 2.75 1.03 
AMA 352 3.47 1.05 
Food processing corporations 353 2.43 0.99 
University scientists 349 3.04 1.21 
Churches and religious organizations 349 3.23 1.07 
Descriptive statistics were computed with trust measured on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means “do not trust 
at all” and 5 means “trust very much.”  
What Respondents Think About the Government and Bioterrorism  
The question “How worried are you about bioterrorism?” generated a slight majority 
(120 or a little more than 34 percent) saying they were “somewhat worried” about it 
(m=3.0, sd=1.18). As shown in Table III, only forty-four (12.5 percent) said they were 
“very worried” about bioterrorist threats. The clustering of responses, however, was in 
the “a little worried” to “worried” range (76 percent), a pattern that indicated some 
ambivalence about perceived threat. This level of worry is somehow incongruent with 
people’s optimism that the government has the ability to ward off a bioterrorist attack.  
As is evident in Table III, the level of dread is high, with majority of the respondents 
(70 percent) reporting they disagree to strongly disagree that they have enough 
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information to protect themselves and their family against such attacks, that the federal 
government is ready (70 percent), that the state and local governments are well 
prepared to protect the nation (73 percent), and that the media are doing a good job of 
informing them about the dangers potential attacks pose (49 percent). Most of them 
agree to strongly agree that more research needs to be done on how to protect the public 
(74 percent), and 56 percent were frightened by the possibility that food and water can 
be contaminated with deadly pathogens. Only 37 percent agree to strongly agree that the 
Department of Homeland Security’s color-coded threat and security advisory helps 
considerably in alerting the public to all kinds of terrorist threats. Less than 8 percent 
know where to get help in case of attacks. As Table III shows, the intensity of responses 
was higher for level of dread. 
 
 
Table III. Distribution of responses to the two dependent variables   
(level of worry and level of dread) 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES      N MEANS STD. 
DEV. 
Level of worrya 352 3.00 1.18 
Feelings of dread about bioterrorismb    
1. I have enough information to protect my family and myself.  212 3.96 1.09 
2. The government is well prepared to protect the nation.  213 3.93 0.96 
3. The state/local government is well prepared. 208 4.03 0.97 
4. More research needs to be done on how to protect the public 347 4.09 1.08 
5. The idea that food and water can be contaminated  
frightens me. 
349 3.66 1.22 
6. DHS’s color-coded security advisory helps the public. 213 3.31 1.28 
7. I know where to get help in case of attacks. 212 4.11 1.05 
8. The media do a good job of informing me of the dangers. 212 3.46 1.10 
9. I am powerless against these attacks. 347 3.00 1.33 
a. Level of worry was measured on a five-point scale, where 1=not worried at all and 5=very worried.  
b. Level of dread was measured using five-point scales, where 1=strongly agree and 5=strongly disagree, 
except for items 4, 5, 6, and 9, which were coded in the opposite direction. 
 
The Influence of Technical/Rational Variables on Level of Worry and Dread 
This study aims to determine what factors account for levels of worry and dread. Table 
IV presents the summary results of four separate multiple linear regression tests that 
sought to determine the impact of the technical/rational variables and normative/value 
variables on worry and dread about bioterrorism. For these analyses, the regression 
method “enter” was used, placing all variables in the equation in blocks regardless of 
their statistical significance.  
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The results show that the four technical/rational variables combined in one block 
were significant predictors of level of worry, accounting for 30.4 percent of the 
explained variance [F(4,63)=6.87, p=.000]. Controlling for the impact of media 
exposure, education, and knowledge of bioterrorism, a significant regression equation 
was found when testing for the influence of media attention on level of worry (t=4.17, 
p=0.000). Thus, of the technical/rational variables, attention to media was the only 
significant predictor. Based on the results, the respondents’ level of worry was fueled by 
exposure and attention to media, but reduced by years of schooling. 
 
Table IV.  A summary of multiple regression results showing the influence of 
technical/rational and normative/value variables on levels of worry and dread 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES LEVEL OF WORRY 
STANDARDIZED 
BETA 
LEVEL OF DREAD 
STANDARDIZED  
BETA 
Technical/Rational   
      Media exposure 0.130 -0.111 
      Media attention 0.471*** 0.021 
      Education -0.071 0.108 
      Knowledge 0.012 -0.100 
Total R-square  0.304         0.039 
   
Normative/Value   
     Trust in media  0.144 0.041 
     Trust in government 0.141 -0.026 
        Trust in universities and 
advocacy groups 
0.120 0.159* 
     Trust in interpersonal sources -0.095 -0.114 
     Alienation from government 0.102 0.526*** 
     Perceived readiness of 
government 
-0.155* -0.195*** 
Total R-square  0.094 0.373 
 
*<.05; **<.01; ***<.001 
  
 
The results of a multiple linear regression test predicting the level of dread based on 
influence of technical/rational variables show a very different picture (Table IV). This 
time, none of the technical/rational independent variables significantly predicted level 
of dread. The regression equation was not significant [F(4,62)=0.619, p=0.651], with the 
four variables combined explaining only 4 percent of the variance. Therefore, none of 
the technical/rational variables had a bearing on level of dread.   
The Influence of Normative/Value Variables on Level of Worry and Dread 
A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict respondents’ level of worry about 
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a bioterrorist attack based on the six predictor variables hypothesized following the 
normative/value approach (Table IV). A significant regression equation was found [F 
(6,240)=4.14, p=0.001] for the influence of this combined block of independent 
variables on level of worry. Of these, the perceived preparedness of the country to stave 
off terrorist attacks contributed substantially to the variance (t=2.30, p=0.022). All of 
these factors were positive contributors to level of worry, except for trust in 
interpersonal communication and perceived readiness of the country to prevent attacks, 
both of which reduced worry. However, the extent to which people perceived the 
government as ready to protect them was the only significant predictor of the 
respondents’ level of worry.  
A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict respondents’ level of dread 
about a bioterrorist attack based on six predictor variables following the 
normative/value approach. This time, the block of normative variables was a very highly 
significant predictor [F (6,245)=24.29, p=0.000]. A significant regression equation was 
found for trust in universities and advocacy groups (t=2.122, p=0.035), alienation from 
government (t=9.019; p=0.000), and perceived readiness of the government to counter 
terrorist attacks (t=3.561, p=0.000). That is, trust in government and interpersonal 
sources, as well as perceived government readiness to counter threats, reduced level of 
dread. Because this equation showed more significant contributors to level of dread, the 
finding supports the contention that normative/value variables are stronger predictors 
of level of dread than rational/technical factors. 
Hierarchical Tests Controlling for Demographics 
To determine the strongest predictors of levels of worry and dread, two hierarchical 
multiple regression tests were employed. These stringent tests were meant to determine 
the influence of the two sets of predictor variables and demographic characteristics on 
worry and dread. In these two tests, the influence of gender, age and income were 
combined to form the first block of independent variables. The technical/rational 
variables constitute the second block, and the normative/value predictors made up the 
third block. 
Table V presents the results of a multiple regression analysis with level of worry as 
the dependent variable. The results show that the block of technical/rational variables 
contributed significantly to level of worry, but the block of normative variables showed 
limited contribution. The strength of the technical/rational block can be attributed to 
attention to mass media bioterrorism content (t=5.08, p=0.000). Demographic 
variables did not predict changes in the dependent variable. Although females were 
likely to be more worried about bioterrorism than males, attention to media content was 
the strongest predictor of the extent to which people were worried about bioterrorist 
incidents in the country.   
The influence of the same set of independent variables on level of dread was also 
determined (Table V). The results indicate that only the block of normative/value 
variables significantly predicted level of dread [F(13,39)=13.52, p=0.000], explaining a 
large percent of the variance (82 percent). Of the variables in this block, trust in 
interpersonal sources (t=2.84, p=0.007), feeling alienated from the government (t=5.32, 
p=0.000), and perceived ability of the government to counter threats (t=5.61, p=0.000) 
were the significant contributors to level of dread. In this examination of the combined 
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impact of other potential contributors, age (t=2.04, p=0.048) and income (t=2.25, 
p=0.030) also exerted some influence (those who were younger and have higher 
incomes dread bioterrorism more) although the block of demographics did not exhibit a 
significant contribution. Media exposure (t=-3.30, p=0.002) and attention to media 
(t=2.36, p=0.024) also showed some predictive power.  
 
As a block, however, the technical/rational variables’ contribution was not significant. 
The results again showcased the impact of the normative variables on dread. Trust in 
interpersonal sources, feeling alienated from the government, and perceived ability of 
 
Table V. Hierarchical regression results showing the influence of technical/rational and 
normative/value variables on level of worry and dread after controlling for demographics 
 
  LEVEL OF WORRY       LEVEL OF DREAD 
 Demographics   
     Age -0.094 -0.162* 
     Gender -0.307 -0.092 
     Income 0.083 0.209* 
R-square change 0.000 0.000 
Total R-square 0.055 0.032 
                     
Technical/Rational   
      Media exposure -0.019 -0.277** 
      Media attention 0.708*** 0.207* 
      Education -0.064 0.111 
      Knowledge 0.063 0.085 
R-square change 0.434*** 0.039 
Total R-square  0.489         0.071 
   
Normative/Value   
     Trust in media -0.056 -0.142 
     Trust in government 0.056 -0.065 
     Trust in universities and   
     advocacy groups 
-0.007 0.041 
     Trust in interpersonal sources -0.076 -0.233** 
     Alienation from government 0.124 0.453*** 
     Perceived readiness of  
     government 
0.089 -0.501*** 
R-square change 0.052 0.747*** 
Total R-square  0.541 0.818 
*<.05; **<.01; ***<.001   
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the government to respond to threats significantly predicted the respondents’ level of 
dread. 
In summary, the technical/rational variable media attention predicted level of worry 
when the impact of only the technical/rational variables was analyzed and when the 
influence of technical variables was combined with that of the normative/value 
predictors and demographic characteristics. The normative variable perceived 
government preparedness to counter terrorist threats was found to significantly reduce 




Table VI. Summary of variables that influence on levels of worry and dread based on 









Level of worry Attention to mass media Perceived government preparedness 
 
Level of dread None Trust in universities and advocacy groups 
Alienation from government 
Perceived government preparedness 
 
When the influence of the two sets of factors, including the demographic variables age, 
gender, and income were combined, the technical/rational variables media exposure 
and attention significantly predicted level of dread. Specifically, media exposure tended 
to heighten dread, but more attention to the content of media reports seemed to reduce 
this effect. The normative factors, however, had a greater impact on dread. Specifically, 
trust in interpersonal sources, feeling alienated from the government, and perceived 
government preparedness considerably lessened it (Table VII).  
 
 
Table VII. Summary of variables that influence levels of worry and dread based on 
multiple regression hierarchical test results 
DEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 




Level of worry Gender Attention to mass media None 
 
Level of dread Age 
Income 
Exposure to mass media 
Attention to mass media 
Trust in interpersonal sources 
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The mean of this national sample’s response showed ambivalence in respondents’ level 
of worry about the use of biological organisms as weapons of terrorism. Their level of 
dread, however, was more than their reported level of worry, indicating that they fear 
the prospect of bioterrorist attacks.  
The results of multiple regression tests indicate that although the two dependent 
variables, level of worry and level of dread, were significantly related (r=0.18, p=0.016), 
they were distinctly different, judging by the variables that predict their strengths. Level 
of worry was significantly influenced by variables representing the technical/rational 
perspective. In this case, attention to mass media was the dominant factor. On the other 
hand, variables that stem from the normative/value perspective – trust in university and 
advocacy groups, trust in interpersonal communication sources, alienation from 
government and perceived readiness of the government to protect the nation – 
accounted for level of dread. Those who paid more attention to mass media bioterrorism 
content were more worried about bioterrorist attacks, while those who felt satisfied that 
the nation is prepared to respond to terrorist threats were less worried about it. Even 
when the influence of other variables was considered, attention to mass media was the 
strongest predictor of level of worry.  
Variables from the two approaches accounted for level of worry, but the 
normative/value variables predicted higher dread. People who were alienated from 
government and who perceived the country as incapable of handling terrorist threats 
showed higher levels of dread. The results of the hierarchical regression analyses 
demonstrated the impact of trust in advocacy groups and on interpersonal 
communication sources on level of dread. Trust in these two sources figured 
prominently because bioterrorist threats are associated with too much uncertainty and 
too little government control. The factors that lead to higher dread suggest that effective 
risk communication may be more a problem of ensuring trust and confidence in the 
government’s ability to protect the nation from terrorist threats than it is an issue of 
explaining bioterrorism in lay terms.  
Implications for Policy 
People’s reactions before, during and after a threatening event can be intense and 
complex. Emergencies like bioterrorist attacks may engender more panicked reactions 
and may prompt a debilitating response, with people potentially acting in irrational 
ways. The findings of this study indicate that the mass media, specifically television and 
newspapers (print and online), are the best ways to reach people during such an 
emergency situation because people are exposed to and attend to them almost as a 
matter of habit. Indeed, exposure and attention to the mass media were found to 
mitigate levels of worry and dread. The results also suggest the need for the general 
public to be aware of and have access to preparedness plans because people have 
implicit trust in family members who are not likely to be experts on the hazards 
bioterrorist attacks engender.  
Any threatening event demands credible and accurate information from sources of 
authority. The findings clearly point to the Centers for Disease Control and the 
American Medical Association as entities that enjoy considerable public trust and can 
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therefore lead the communication effort. People also may resort to primary health care 
providers and other public health officials as trusted interpersonal sources of 
information. These individuals, therefore, constitute an important audience segment 
that may demand more information to be able to respond to face-to-face inquiries.    
Perhaps as important as identifying the outlets for information dissemination, risk 
communicators should endeavor to ascertain the factors that underlie levels of worry 
and dread. The results suggest that during such an uncertain period, normative/value 
factors exert a greater influence on the extent to which people may be worried or have 
feelings of dread. Trust in universities and advocacy groups and interpersonal sources; 
alienation from government; and perceived government preparedness to handle such 
attacks were found to be significant predictors of worry and dread. Thus, a preparedness 
plan must incorporate practices intended to enhance public trust.    
A bioterrorism incident offers a test case for crisis communication because such an 
event is characterized by a continuous sense of urgency and a rapid rate of change. In 
these situations, messages may be confusing, contradictory, and subject to change as the 
events evolve. In cases like this, people may experience a range of strong emotions, 
including fear, anger, panic, denial, laying blame, strong solidarity with others, a desire 
to help victims, and the need for personal control. All these may affect how they respond 
to a risk. Communication must account for these responses, including giving people 
reasonable and appropriate actions to take. Messages should not try to over-reassure or 
convince people there is nothing to be afraid of. Instead, it is important to acknowledge 
and accept that worry and dread are legitimate reactions, and then tell people what is 
being done and what they can do.  
Another trust-enhancing practice is to address misperceptions at the planning stage 
and during the emergency. Designated trained spokespersons should explain what is 
known at the time and what is unknown, pinpointing what is preliminary and indicating 
what is being done to find out more. They must also concede errors and modify previous 
statements as more information comes to light. This is so because people want honest 
and accurate information about terror-related situations even if it makes them worried 
and highly fearful.  
A public that has sympathized with its government in the aftermath of 9/11 has also 
been made irate by government inaction during and after Hurricane Katrina. This is 
perhaps why, although people indicate reservations about the government’s ability to 
protect citizens during terrorism incidents, they still believe it can do more to enhance 
national security and well-being. The measures outlined above tap into this sentiment 
and can serve as the basis for maintaining public trust. Simply put, as the findings 
indicate, if one can trust, one can take the risk.  
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